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Résumé: Nous étudions les jeux stochastiques à somme nulle où les joueurs n'observent
pas nécessairement les actions choisies par leur adversaire. Nous supposons
seulement que chacun des joueurs observe au moins l'état courant du jeu, ainsi
que sa propre action. L'article propose un traitement unifié de plusieurs
résultats dus à Coulomb.
Abstract: We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the
actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may
depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We
assume each player observes the state and his own action.
We propose a candidate for the max-min value, which does not depend on the
information structure of player 2. We prove that player 2 can defend the
proposed max-min value, and that in absorbing games player 1 can guarantee
it. Analogous results hold for the min-max value. This paper thereby unites
several results due to Coulomb.
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1 Introduction
The classical literature on repeated games and stochastic games considers models with perfect
monitoring – past play is observed by the players.
In the last two decades models with imperfect monitoring were explored, and several applications
of these models were studied (see, e.g., Radner (1981), Rubinstein and Yaari (1983)). Lehrer
(1989, 1990, 1992a, 1992b) has characterized various notions of undiscounted equilibria in infinitely
repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
In the present paper we are interested in two-player zero sum stochastic games with imperfect
monitoring. These games are played as follows. At every stage, the game is in one of finitely
many states. Each player chooses an action, independently of his opponent. The current state,
together with the pair of actions, determine a daily payoff that player 2 pays player 1, a probability
distribution according to which a new state is chosen, and a probability distribution over pairs of
signals, one for each player. Each player is then informed of his private signal, and of the new state.
However, no player is informed of his opponent’s signal, and of the daily payoff.
Coulomb (1992, 1999, 2001) was the first to study stochastic games with imperfect monitoring.
He studied the class of absorbing games, and proved that the max-min value (and similarly the
min-max value) exists. That is, there is a quantity v ∈ R such that for every ε > 0, (i) player 1 has
a strategy that guarantees that his expected average payoff in all sufficiently long games exceeds
v − ε, whatever player 2 plays, and (ii) for every strategy of player 1, player 2 has a reply such
that the expected average payoff in all sufficiently long games does not exceed v+ ε. Coulomb also
provides a formula for the calculation of the max-min value and the min-max value in absorbing
games.
One of Coulomb’s main findings is that the max-min value does not depend on the signaling
structure of player 2. Similarly, the min-max value does not depend on the signaling structure of
player 1.
In the present paper we propose a candidate for the max-min and the min-max values in
general stochastic games. As in the case of absorbing games, the candidate for the max-min value
is independent of the information structure of player 2, and the candidate for the min-max value
is independent of the information structure of player 1. These values are limits of max-min and
min-max values of certain auxiliary discounted games.
We prove that player 2 can defend the proposed max-min value, and that in absorbing games
player 1 can guarantee it. The proof that player 1 can guarantee the max-min value in general
stochastic games is substantially more difficult, and is dealt with in a companion paper.
The approach that we take is quite different from that of Coulomb. We first define an equivalence
relation over mixed actions of player 2, that has similarities with the one used in Lehrer’s and
Coulomb’s works. The definition takes into account the fact that we use discounted games, hence
events that occur rarely (relative to the discount factor) do not affect the payoff. Using this
equivalence relation we define a new daily payoff function. We then define an auxiliary discounted
max-min value as a fixed point of a functional equation that is based on the auxiliary daily payoff
function. Finally, we prove that the max-min value is the limit of these auxiliary discounted max-
min values.
To prove the last claim we would like to use the method developed by Mertens and Neyman
(1981) for perfect monitoring stochastic games. Unfortunately, the new payoff function is convex
but not necessarily multi-linear, which is a crucial requirement in Mertens and Neyman’s proof.
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Nevertheless, the method of Mertens and Neyman goes through for player 2; that is, it shows that
player 2 can defend the proposed max-min value.
The method of studying asymptotic properties of auxiliary discounted games by defining a new
payoff function appears already in Solan (1999) and in Solan and Vohra (1999), in the study of
equilibria in n-player absorbing games. The present work is the first time where this method is
successfully applied to general stochastic games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and the statement of the main
results. In Section 3 we introduce a number of tools, define the auxiliary discounted games, and
study some of their basic properties. Section 4 contains a reminder of the analysis of Mertens and
Neyman. In Section 5 we deal with player 2’s side of the analysis in the general case and in Section
6 with player 1’s side in the case of absorbing games. We end the paper by showing how our tools
can be used to show that if player 1 receives no signals, he can guarantee the max-min value by
stationary strategies, as was already shown by Coulomb (1992).
Thus, our paper offers a unified treatment of Coulomb (1992,1999,2001). It also lays down tools
that are used in the analysis of the general case.
2 The model
For every finite set K, ∆(K) is the space of probability distributions over K. We identify each
element k ∈ K with the probability distribution in ∆(K) that gives weight 1 to k.
We consider the standard model of finite two-person zero-sum stochastic games with signals.
Such a game is described by: (i) a finite set S of states, (ii) finite action sets A and B for the two
players, (iii) a daily reward function r : S × A×B → R, (iv) finite sets M1 and M2 of signals for
the two players and (v) a transition function ψ : S ×A×B → ∆(M1 ×M2 × S).
The game is played in stages. The initial state s1 is known to both players. At each stage
n ∈ N, (a) the players independently choose actions an and bn; (b) player 1 gains r(sn, an, bn), and
player 2 looses the same amount; (c) a triple (m1n,m
2
n, sn+1) is drawn according to ψ(sn, an, bn);
(d) players 1 and 2 are told respectively m1n and m
2
n, but they are not informed of an, bn, or
r(sn, an, bn); and (e) the game proceeds to stage n+ 1.
We assume throughout that each player always knows the current state, and the action he is
playing. In terms of ψ, this amounts to assuming that the signal received by player i contains the
identity of the new state and the name of the action he has just chosen: if m1 ∈ M1 has positive
probability under both ψ(s, a, b) and ψ(s′, a′, b′) then (s, a) = (s′, a′). An analogous property holds
with reversed roles for player 2. We also assume perfect recall, so each player remembers the
sequence of signals he has received so far.
We assume w.l.o.g. that payoffs are non-negative and bounded by 1.
We denote by Hn = S × (A × B ×M1 ×M2 × S)n−1 the set of histories up to stage n,1 by
H1n = S × (M1)n−1 and H2n = S × (M2)n−1 the set of histories to players 1 and 2 respectively.
We equip these spaces with the discrete topology. We also let H∞ = (S × A × B ×M1 ×M2)N
denote the set of infinite plays, Hin denote the cylinder algebra over H∞ induced by H in, and we
set H∞ = σ(H1n ∪H2n, n ≥ 1), the σ-algebra generated by all those cylinder algebras. We let sn,an
1Since the signal of each player contains the current state and his action, some information in this representation
is redundant.
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and bn denote respectively the state at stage n, and the action played at stage n: these are random
variables, and are respectively Hin, H1n+1 and H2n+1 measurable.
Whenever convenient, we use the convention that boldfaced letters denote random variables,
and non boldfaced letters denote the value of the random variable.
A (behavioral) strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) is a sequence σ = (σn)n≥1 (resp. τ = (τn)n≥1)
of functions σn : H
1
n → ∆(A) (resp. τn : H2n → ∆(B)). Such a strategy is stationary if the mixed
move used at stage n depends only on sn (which is known to both players). Every stationary strategy
of player 1 (resp. player 2) can be identified with a vector x ∈ (∆(A))S (resp. y ∈ (∆(B))S), with
the interpretation that x(s) is the lottery used by player 1 whenever the play visits state s.
Given a pair (σ, τ) of strategies and an initial state s, we denote by Ps,σ,τ the probability
distribution induced over (H∞,H∞) by (σ, τ) and s, and by Es,σ,τ the corresponding expectation
operator. The expected average payoff up to stage n is
γn(s, σ, τ) = Es,σ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
r(sk,ak,bk)
]
.
Definition 1 v(s) is the max-min value of the game with initial state s if:
• Player 1 can guarantee v(s): for every ε > 0, there exists a strategy σ of player 1 and N ∈ N,
such that:
∀τ,∀n ≥ N, γn(s, σ, τ) ≥ v(s)− ε.
• Player 2 can defend v(s): for every ε > 0 and every strategy σ of player 1 there exists a
strategy τ of player 2 and N ∈ N, such that:
∀n ≥ N, γn(s, σ, τ) ≤ v(s) + ε.
The definition of the min-max value is obtained by exchanging the roles of the two players.
Coulomb (1999, 2001) proved that the max-min value exists in every absorbing game. Moreover,
Coulomb provides a formula for the max-min value, which is independent of the signaling structure
of player 2. By exchanging the roles of the two players, Coulomb derives an analogous result for
the min-max value.
3 Indistinguishable moves
3.1 Definition and continuity properties
We start by defining an equivalence relation between mixed actions of player 2; two mixed actions y
and y′ are equivalent if the probability that player 1 can not distinguish y from y′ is high. Variants of
this relation have played a central role in earlier analysis of games with imperfect monitoring, such
as in the work of Aumann and Mashler (1995), Lehrer (1989,1990,1992) and Coulomb (1999,2001).
Given ε, λ > 0,2 s ∈ S and x ∈ ∆(A), we define a binary relation ∼λ,ε,s,x over ∆(B) as follows:
y ∼λ,ε,s,x y′ if and only if ψ(s, a, y) = ψ(s, a, y′) whenever x[a] ≥ λ/ε.
2
λ always stands for a discount factor. Here and in the sequel we omit the condition λ ≤ 1.
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Thus, y and y′ are equivalent for x at s if every action of player 1 that can be used to distinguish
between y and y′ is played under x with low probability. This notion plays a fundamental role in
our work. We therefore study it in some detail.
First, we provide a geometric rewriting of the definition. For the time being, we let λ, ε, x and s
be given, and denote by A =
{
a ∈ A, x[a] ≥ λ
ε
}
the set of actions that are relevant for the relation.
We also write y ∼ z for the more cumbersome y ∼λ,ε,s,x y′. We denote by Ψ : RB → RA the linear
map Ψ(Y ) = (ψ(s, a, Y ))a∈A, where ψ(s, a, Y ) =
∑
b∈B Y (b)ψ(s, a, b), and by N the kernel of Ψ:
N = {Y ∈ RB | Ψ(Y ) = ~0}. Plainly,
y ∼ z ⇔ z − y ∈ N .
Thus, denoting F (y) := {z ∈ ∆(B), y ∼ z}, one has
F (y) = (y +N) ∩∆(B).
This formulation allows for a straightforward verification of some simple properties. In particular,
F (y) is compact. Also, for every y1, y2 ∈ ∆(B) and every α ∈ [0, 1], by convexity of both N and
∆(K),
αF (y1) + (1− α)F (y2) = α((y1 +N) ∩∆(K)) + (1− α)((y2 +N) ∩∆(K))
⊆ F (αy1 + (1− αy2). (1)
Lemma 2 ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. We prove only transitivity. Assume y1 ∼ y2 and y2 ∼ y3. This means y2 − y1 ∈ N and
y3 − y2 ∈ N . This implies y3 − y1 ∈ N hence y1 ∼ y3.
Remark: An alternative definition of the relation ∼λ,ε,s,x is the following: y ∼λ,ε,s,x y′ if and
only if ‖ψ(s, x, y)−ψ(s, x, y′)‖ < λ/ε. However, in this definition the relation is not transitive, and
we were unable to prove Lemma 4 below.
Let k > 0. Recall that a set-valued map F between two metric sets (E1, d1) and (E2, d2) is k-
Lipschitz if F (y) ⊆ B(F (y′), kd1(y, y′)) for each y, y′ ∈ E1 (Definition 4, p.44 in Aubin and Cellina
(1984)).
By Aubin and Frankowska (1990, Theorem 2.2.6) it follows that the set-valued map F is k-
Lipschitz, for some k > 0.
Note that the set-valued map F depends on λ, ε, s and x only through the set A. Since A and
S are finite, only finitely many set-valued maps arise as λ, ε, s and x vary. In particular, we may
choose a constant K > 0 such that all these maps are K-Lipschitz.
We define a function r˜ that is to be thought of as the worst payoff consistent with a given
distribution of signals to player 1: given ε, λ > 0, s ∈ S and (x, y) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(B), we set
r˜ελ(s, x, y) = inf
z∼λ,ε,s,xy
r(s, x, z). (2)
We now establish useful properties of r˜.
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Lemma 3 For every ε, λ > 0, every x ∈ ∆(A) and every s ∈ S, the function r˜ελ(s, x, ·) : ∆(B)→ R
is convex and (K + 1)-Lipshitz.
Proof. We start with convexity. Let y = αy1 + (1− α)y2, where y1, y2 ∈ ∆(B) and α ∈ [0, 1].
We use the previous notations. By (1) and since r is multi-linear,
r˜ελ(s, x, y) = inf
z∈F (y)
r(s, x, z) ≤ inf
z∈αF (y1)+(1−α)F (y2)
r(s, x, z)
= α inf
z∈F (y1)
r(s, x, z) + (1− α) inf
z∈F (y2)
r(s, x, z),
Since r is non-negative and multi-linear, the function y 7→ r(s, x, y) is 1-Lipshitz. By Aubin
and Cellina (1984, Theorem 1.7), y 7→ infz∈F (y) r(s, x, z) is (K + 1)-Lipshitz.
Denote by ∆(B)upslopeN the quotient space of ∆(B) by the equivalence relation ∼λ,ε,s,x, endowed
with the quotient topology. For y ∈ ∆(B), we denote by cl(y) its projection over ∆(B)upslopeN . Plainly,
d(cl(y), cl(z)) := ‖Ψ(y)−Ψ(z)‖ = ‖Ψ(y − z)‖
defines a metric over ∆(B)upslopeN , whose topology coincides with the quotient topology. By definition,
r˜ελ(s, x, y) depends on y only through cl(y), hence there is a map r̂ : ∆(B)upslopeN → R, such that
r˜ελ(s, x, ·) = r̂◦π, where π : ∆(B)→ ∆(B)upslopeN is the projection map. Since r˜ελ(s, x, ·) is continuous,
so is r̂. Therefore, we have established the following.
Lemma 4 For every δ > 0, there is η > 0 such that for every s ∈ S, every x ∈ ∆(A), and every
y, z ∈ ∆(B), the following is satisfied: if ‖ψ(s, a, y)− ψ(s, a, z)‖ < η for every a ∈ A that satisfies
x[a] ≥ λ/ε, then |r˜ελ(s, x, y)− r˜ελ(s, x, z)| < δ.
3.2 The candidate for the max-min value
We here posit a quantity which is our candidate for the max-min value of the game. We denote by
q : S ×A×B → ∆(S) the transition function induced by ψ :
q(s′|s, a, b) = ψ(s, a, b)[{s′} ×M1 ×M2].
the multi-linear extension of q to S×∆(A)×∆(B) is still denoted by q. For every s ∈ S, and every
(x, y) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(B), denote by E [·|s, x, y] the expectation with respect to q(·|s, x, y).
Given λ, ε > 0 and w : S → R, define Tλ,εw : S → R by
Tλ,εw(s) := sup
x∈∆(A)
inf
y∈∆(B)
{λr˜ελ(s, x, y) + (1− λ)E [w|s, x, y]} .
Thus, Tλ,ε is an operator that acts on real-valued functions defined over S.
Lemma 5 For each λ, ε > 0, the operator Tλ,ε has a unique fixed point, v
ε
λ.
6
Proof. Plainly, Tλ,ε is non-decreasing. Moreover, Tλ,ε(w + c1) =Tλ,εw + (1 − λ)c1, for each
c ∈ R and w : S → R, where 1 : S → R is the function defined by 1(s) = 1 for every s ∈ S. By
Blackwell’s criterion, Tλ,ε is strictly contracting, hence has a unique fixed point.
Our candidate for the max-min value when the initial state is s is
v(s) = lim
ε→0
lim
λ→0
vελ(s).
The existence of the limit, together with additional properties of interest, is established in the
next section. Observe that vελ(s) depends only on the structure of signals to player 1, hence so does
v(s).
The main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 6 Player 2 can defend v. In addition, if there is one non-absorbing state, player 1 can
guarantee v.
3.3 Algebraic properties
We collect in Proposition 8 below the semi-algebraic properties that are useful for our purposes.
Lemma 7 For every state s ∈ S, the function φs : (ε, λ, x, y) 7→ r˜ελ(s, x, y) is semi-algebraic.
Proof. Fix s ∈ S. The set
E =
{
(ε, λ, x, y, y′, r) ∈ (0, 1)2 ×∆(A)× (∆(B))2 ×R : y ∼λ,ε,s,x y′, r = r(s, x, y′)
}
is defined by finitely many polynomial inequalities. In particular, it is semi-algebraic. Therefore
the graph of φs, which is equal to{
(ε, λ, x, y, r) ∈ (0, 1)2 ×∆(A)×∆(B)×R : r = inf{r′ ∈ R, (ε, λ, x, y, y′, r′) ∈ E}}
is semi-algebraic as well.
Using Lemma 5 one can now deduce the following.
Proposition 8 For every state s ∈ S, (i) the function (λ, ε) 7→ vελ(s) is semi-algebraic, and (ii)
the set {
(ε, λ, x) ∈ (0, 1)2 ×∆(A), inf
y
{λr˜ελ(s, x, y) + (1− λ)E [vελ|s, x, y]} ≥ vελ(s)− ελ
}
is semi-algebraic.
In particular, for every fixed ε > 0, limλ→0 v
ε
λ(s) exists. Since the function ε 7→ limλ→0 vελ(s) is
monotonic, the limit v(s) = limε→0 limλ→0 v
ε
λ(s) exists.
For every state s ∈ S define
G = {(λ, ε, z) ∈ (0, 1)2 ×RS | λ ≤ ε2, z = vελ}. (3)
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Gs is a semi-algebraic set, whose closure contains (0, 0, v). Indeed, for every η > 0 there is ε0 > 0
sufficiently small such that ‖ limλ→0 vελ − v‖ < η for every ε ∈ (0, ε0). Hence for every ε ∈ (0, ε0)
there is λ0(ε) ∈ (0, 1) such that ‖vελ − v‖ < 2η for every λ ∈ (0, λ0(ε)).3
By the Curve Selection Theorem (see, e.g. Bochnak et al (1998, Theorem 2.5.5)) there is a
continuous semi-algebraic function f : (0, 1)→ G such that limr→0 f(r) = (0, 0, v).
Write f(r) = (λ(r), ε(r), v
ε(r)
λ(r)). The functions r 7→ λ(r), r 7→ ε(r) and r 7→ v
ε(r)
λ(r)(s) (for s ∈ S)
are semi-algebraic, hence monotone in a neighborhood of zero. Since λ > 0 for each (λ, ε, v) ∈ G,
and since limr→0 λ(r) = 0, the function λ(r) is invertible in a neighborhood of zero. Hence, there
is a semi-algebraic function λ 7→ ε(λ) such that, in a neighborhood of 0, (λ, ε(λ), vε(λ)λ ) ∈ G and
limλ→0 v
ε(λ)
λ = v.
We denote by d the degree in λ of the function λ 7→ ε(λ). That is, limλ→0 λd/ε(λ) ∈ (0,∞). By
the definition of G, d ∈ (0, 1/2].
4 Reminder on zero-sum games
The purpose of this section is to provide a slight modification of a result due to Mertens and Neyman
(henceforth MN) (1981) , that we will use. We let λ 7−→ wλ be aRS-valued semi-algebraic function,
and w = limλ→0wλ.
Let ε > 0, Z ≥ 0 and two functions λ : (0,+∞) → (0, 1) and L : (0,+∞) → N be given. Set
δ = ε/48. Assume that the following conditions are satisfied for every z ≥ Z, every |η| ≤ 4 and
every s ∈ S:
C1 |wλ(s)− w(s)| ≤ 4δ;
C2 4L(z) ≤ δz;
C3 |λ(z + ηL(z))− λ(z)| ≤ δλ(z)
C4
∣∣wλ(z+ηL(z))(s)− wλ(z)(s)∣∣ ≤ 4δL(z)λ(z)
C5
∫∞
Z
λ(z)dz ≤ 4δ.
MN (1981) note that C1-C5 hold for Z large enough, in each of the next two cases:
Case 1 λ(z) = z−β and L(z) = ⌈λ(z)−α⌉,4 where α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 1 satisfy αβ < 1;
Case 2 L(z) = 1 and λ(z) = 1/z(ln z)2.
Let (r̂k)k∈N be a [0, 1]-valued process defined on the set of plays. Define recursively processes
3The condition λ ≤ ε2 in (3) can be replaced by λ ≤ εc for any c > 1.
4For every c ∈ R, ⌈c⌉ is the minimal integer greater than or equal to c.
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(zk), (Lk) and (Bk) by the formulas
z0 = Z,B0 = 1,
λk = λ(zk), Lk = L(zk), Bk+1 = Bk + Lk,
zk+1 = max
Z, zk + λk
Lkr̂k − ∑
Bk≤n<Bk+1
wλk(sn)
+ ε
2
 .
Let (Ik) be a {0, 1}-valued process, where Ik is H1Bk−1-measurable and Ik = 1 for at most one
value of k. This process does not appear in MN (1981) formulation.
Theorem 9 Let (σ, τ) be a strategy pair. Assume that for every k ≥ 0,
Es,σ,τ
[
λkLkr̂k + εIk + (1− λkLk)wλk(sBk+1)|H1Bk
]
(4)
≥ wλk(sBk)−
ε
12
λkLk. (5)
Then there exists N0 ∈ N, independent of (σ, τ), such that the following holds for every n ≥ N0:
Es,σ,τ
 1
n
n∑
p=1
R̂n
 ≥ w(s)− 2ε, (6)
where R̂n = r̂k whenever Bk ≤ n < Bk+1. Moreover,
Es,σ,τ
[
∞∑
k=1
λkLk
]
< +∞. (7)
The result also holds when replacing in (5) and (6) ≥ by ≤, and the ‘+’ sign on the right-hand
side by a ‘-’ sign.
Proof. This statement differs from the statement in MN (1981) through the additional process
Ik.
To handle the term εIk on the left-hand side, it is enough to introduce the following changes
in Mertens and Neyman (1981). First, add εIk in Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5. Second, define Yk as
Yk = lk − tk + ε
∑
p<k Ip, and rewrite the second consequence of Proposition 3.6 as E(l¯i) ≥ l¯0 −
12δ − εE
[∑
p<k(i) Ik
]
≥ l¯0 − 12δ − ε. Finally, rewrite the subsequent computation taking into
account the additional term −ε.
In MN’s analysis, r̂k is the average payoff received by player 1 during stages Bk, Bk−1 +
1, . . . , Bk+1 − 1. Here, this variable is not observable, and r̂k will be defined as the worst pay-
off to player 1, consistent with his observations on block k. Since signals depend randomly on
actions, many stages are needed to provide a reliable estimator of the moves selected by player 2.
This is why strategies (for player 1’s side) will be defined in blocks. In the case of absorbing games
(see later for a definition), early absorption on a block may prevent such a computation. In fact,
for all blocks during which the probability of reaching an absorbing state is non negligible, it is
very difficult to relate r̂k to the moves used by player 2. Therefore, we introduce a flag Ik, that
will be interpreted as “absorption occurs during block k”. The condition on Ik arises from the fact
that absorption may occur at most once during the play.
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5 Player 2 can defend v
We prove in this section that player 2 can defend v. Since the value of vελ, hence of v, is independent
of the signaling structure for player 2, we need to prove the result for the least favorable situation
for player 2, i.e., the case where player 2 is only told the current state.
Let s ∈ S and ε > 0 be given. We shall prove that player 2 can defend limλ→0 vελ(s). Let a
strategy σ of player 1 be given. Given a strategy τ, for every n ∈ N and every λ ∈ (0, 1), we let
yλn ∈ ∆(S) satisfy
λr˜ελ(sn, ξn,y
λ
n) + (1− λ)E
[
vελ|sn, ξn,yλn
]
≤ vελ(sn) +
ε
12
λ,
where ξn = Es,σ,τ [an|s1, .., sn] is the expected mixed action of player 1 given the information of
player 2 at stage n. We also choose yλn ∼λ,ε,sn,ξn yλn such that
r(sn, ξn,y
λ
n) = r˜
ε
λ(sn, ξn,y
λ
n).
Since player 2 knows σ, he can calculate ξn, hence also y
λ
n and y
λ
n.
We now apply the result stated in Section 4, Case 2 (L(z) = 1, λ(z) = 1/(z(ln(z))2)), r̂n =
r˜ελn(sn, ξn,y
λn
n ) and Ik = 0 for every k ≥ 0.
We let τ be the strategy of player 2 that plays yλnn in stage n, where ξn is computed using τ .
The computation of ξn involves only the restriction of τ to the first n− 1 stages, hence there is no
circularity in this definition. Both conclusions (6) (with inequalities reversed) and (7) of Theorem
9 are satisfied w.r.t. (σ, τ).
By (7), there is N ∈ N such that
Es,σ,τ
[
∞∑
n=N
λn
]
<
ε2
|A| . (8)
We define a strategy τ for player 2 as: play yλnn in each stage n < N, and y
λn
n in each stage n ≥ N .
We prove that τ defends limλ v
ε
λ(s) + 2ε. The definition of τ is reminiscent of the type of replies
defined by Coulomb (2001). Loosely speaking, under τ , player 2 plays for good transitions up to
stage N , and for low payoffs afterwards.
By definition,
Ps,σ,τ
(
ψ1(sn,an,y
λn
n ) 6= ψ1(sn,an,yλnn )|H1n
)
≤ |A|λn
ε
, for each n ≥ N.
Using (8), this implies that
Ps,σ,τ
(
H∞
)
< ε, (9)
where H∞ is the H1∞-measurable set
H∞ =
{
ψ1(sn,an,y
λn
n ) 6= ψ1(sn,an,yλnn ) for some n ≥ N
}
.
Therefore, supF∈H1∞ |Ps,σ,τ (F )−Ps,σ,τ (F )| < ε. Since ξn is H1n-measurable, one obtains∣∣∣Es,σ,τ [r˜ελn(sn, ξn,yλnn )]−Es,σ,τ [r˜ελn(sn, ξn,yλnn )]∣∣∣ ≤ ε for each n ∈ N.
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By the choice of yλnn , Es,σ,τ
[
r˜ελn(sn, ξn,y
λn
n )
]
= Es,σ,τ [r(sn,an,bn)], for every n ≥ N . By summa-
tion, one obtains for every n ≥ N/ε,
γn(s, σ, τ) = Es,σ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
r(sn,an,bn)
]
≤ Es,σ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
r˜ελn(sn, ξn,y
λn
n )
]
+ ε.
By (6), this yields
γn(s, σ, τ) ≤ lim
λ→0
vελ(s) + 2ε,
for every n sufficiently large, as desired.
6 Absorbing games: player 1 can guarantee v
In this section we restrict ourselves to absorbing games. An absorbing state is a state s ∈ S
such that q(s|s, a, b) = 1, for each (a, b) ∈ A × B. Since the current state sn is known to both
players, and since in repeated games with imperfect monitoring the max-min value coincides with
the value of the game with perfect monitoring, we may assume that for every absorbing state s ∈ S,
r(s) := r(s, a, b) is independent of (a, b) ∈ A×B.
A game is absorbing if all states but one are absorbing. Clearly, the unique interesting starting
state is the non absorbing one. From now on, we assume that the unique non absorbing state is the
initial state, and we shall make no reference to it, unless when useful. We denote by θ the stage of
absorption. If absorption never occurs, θ = +∞. Thus, θ + 1 is the first stage in which the play is
not in the non absorbing state.
We let ω > 0 satisfy ω < ψ1(m1 | a, b), whenever the right hand side is strictly positive.
Throughout the section, ε ∈ (0, 1/300|B|) is given. We let η < 1/25 be given by Lemma 4 w.r.t.
ε, and we fix δ < min{η2, ε2}.
6.1 The strategy
Recall from Section 3.3 that there is a semi-algebraic function ε : (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that λ ≤
(ε(λ))2 for every λ ∈ (0, 1), limλ→0 ε(λ) = 0 and limλ→0 vε(λ)λ = v. We there defined d ∈ (0, 12 ]
to be the degree in λ of ε(λ). For notational simplicity, we write vλ and r˜λ instead of the more
cumbersome v
ε(λ)
λ and r˜
ε(λ)
λ . For λ ∈ (0, 1), we let xλ ∈ ∆(A) be a mixed move of player 1 that
satisfies:
λr˜λ(xλ, y) + (1− λ)E [vλ(·)|xλ, y] ≥ vλ − ελ, ∀y ∈ ∆(B). (10)
We apply the result of Section 4, with Case 1 (λ(z) = z−β, L(z) = ⌈λ(z)−α⌉), where α ∈
(1− d, 1) is close enough to one so that ‖vλ − v‖ < λ1−α in a neighborhood of zero. We will let σ
be the strategy that, for every k ∈ N, plays xλkon the k-th block, i.e. in stage Bk, ..., Bk+1− 1. We
set Ik = 1 if absorption occurs during the kth block, and 0 otherwise. To complete the definition
of σ, it remains to define the variable r̂k that is used to update zk, and the parameter Z.
If absorption occurred prior to stage Bk; that is, before the current block started, then r̂k is
equal to the payoff at the absorbing state.
Otherwise, the value of r̂k depends only on the sequence of signals received during block k. For
notational simplicity, we drop the subscript k; we thus write L instead of Lk, λ instead of λk, etc.
We also relabel the stages of block k from 1 to L, so that Bk+1 = L+ 1.
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We let A = {a ∈ A, xλ(a) ≥ λ/ε(λ)}. For a ∈ A, we let ρa ∈ ∆(M1) stand for the empirical
distribution of signals received by player 1 in the stages where a was played:
ρa[m] =
∣∣{n ≤ L,m1n = m}∣∣
|{n ≤ L,an = a}|
We let ρ ∈ (∆(M1))A be the vector with coordinates (ρa)a∈A. Following the notations used in
Section 3.1, we set Ψ(y) = (ψ(a, y))a∈A, for y ∈ ∆(B).
We let ŷ minimize
‖ρ−Ψ(y)‖∞ (11)
among y ∈ ∆(B), and define
r̂ =
{
0 θ ≤ L+ 1
r˜λ(xλ, ŷ) θ > L+ 1
Thus, given a sequence of signals, player 1 computes a stationary strategy that is most consistent
with the sequence of signals, and r̂ is the corresponding worst payoff.
The parameter Z that appears in the definition of σ will be fixed in Section 6.2.
6.2 A large number estimate
Here and later, it is convenient, and not restrictive, to assume that the play proceeds up to stage
L+ 1, with players choosing actions, even if θ < L+ 1. We denote by y = 1
L
∑L
n=1 bn ∈ ∆(B) the
empirical distribution of player 2’s moves.
We prove that, with high probability, the empirical distribution of signals to player 1 is close
to the (theoretical) distribution, given the sequence of moves actually played by player 2.
Lemma 10 For every a ∈ A and every strategy τ , one has
Pxλ,τ (
∥∥ψ1(a,y)− ρa∥∥ ≥ η) ≤ ε,
provided Z is sufficiently large.
Proof. Let 0 < η̂ < η satisfy η = 2η̂/(1− η̂).
For b ∈ B, we denote by Nb = |{n ≤ L,bn = b}| the number of times the action b is played
by player 2. For a ∈ A and m1 ∈ M1, the meaning of Na and Nm1 is similar. Also, Nb,m1 =∣∣{n ≤ L,bn = b,m1n = m1}∣∣.
Fix b ∈ B, and let a ∈ A and m1 ∈M1 satisfy ψ1(m1|a, b) > 0.
In every stage n ≤ L such that bn = b, the r.v. Xn that is equal to 1 ifm1n = m1 and 0 otherwise
is a Bernouilli r.v. with parameter p = ψ1(m1 | xλ, b) = xλ(a)ψ1(m1|a, b) ≥ ωxλ(a), where the
second equality holds since the signal m1 contains the action a. Moreover, the r.v.s (Xn)n≤L,bn=b
are iid. Choose ξ ∈ (0, 1− 1−d
α
). Provided L is sufficiently large, Lxλ(a) > L
ξ for every a ∈ A. For
every η ∈ (0, 1) set cη = min{η2/2,− ln((1 + η)1+η exp(η))}. By Alon et al (2001, Corollary A.14)
Pxλ,τ
(∣∣∣∣Nm1,bNb − ψ1(m1|xλ, b)
∣∣∣∣ > η̂|B|ψ1(m1 | xλ, b) and Nb ≥ Lξ
)
≤
L∑
n=Lξ
exp(−c η̂
|B|
nxλ(a)) ≤
exp(−c η̂
|B|
Lξxλ(a))
1− exp(−c η̂
|B|
xλ(a))
≤ ε
2|B| ,
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provided Z is chosen large enough (recall that xλ(z)(a) ≥ c(λ(z))1−d for some constant c and every
z large enough).
Note that, if Nb < L
ξ, the inequality
∣∣Nm1,b −Nbψ1(m1|xλ, b)∣∣ ≤ η|B|Lxλ(a) holds trivially for
Z large enough.
Since Nbψ
1(m1 | xλ, b) = xλ(a)Nbψ1(m1 | a, b) ≤ Lxλ(a), we have with probability at least
1− ε/2B, ∣∣Nm1,b −Nbψ1(m1|xλ, b)∣∣ ≤ η̂|B|Lxλ(a). (12)
By summing (12) over b ∈ B, this yields∣∣Nm1 − Lxλ(a)ψ1(m1|a,y)∣∣ ≤ η̂Lxλ(a),
with probability at least 1− ε/2.
Similarly, provided Z is sufficiently large, for every a ∈ A, with probability at least 1 − ε/2,
|Na/L− xλ(a)| ≤ η̂xλ(a), which implies that Lxλ(a)/Na < 1/(1 − η̂). Hence, with probability at
least 1− ε, one has ∣∣∣∣Nm1Na − ψ1(m1|a,y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2η̂1− η̂ = η,
and the result follows.
We are now able to list the properties that Z should satisfy. We choose Z large enough so that:
D1 C1-C5 of Section 4 are satisfied w.r.t. wλ = vλ.
D2 2
∣∣A×B ×M1∣∣2 (λ(z))α−(1−d) < ηε, for each z ≥ Z.
D3 The conclusion of Lemma 10 holds.
D4 λ(z)L(z) ≤ δε for each z ≥ Z.
6.3 Applying the technique of Mertens and Neyman
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the next Proposition.
Proposition 11 Provided Z satisfies D1-D4, there exists N0 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N0 and
every strategy τ ,
γn(σ, τ) ≥ v − (12× 2× 18 + 3)ε.
The proof of the Proposition goes as follows. Consider a single block k. All the computations
are conditional on H1Bk . For notational simplicity, we omit any reference to k and relabel the stages
of that block from 1 to L := L(zk). We let I = 1θ≤L+1 and w(τ) = Pxλ,τ (θ ≤ L + 1) = Exλ,τ [I]
denote the probability that absorption occurs within the block.
The proof follows from two lemmas.
Lemma 12 For every strategy τ of player 2, one has
Exλ,τ [λLr̂+ εI + (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)] ≥ vλ − 18ελL. (13)
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Lemma 12 enables us to invoke Theorem 9. It is proved in the next section. To complete the
proof of Proposition 11, it is sufficient to prove the following.
Lemma 13 There exists N0 such that, for every n ≥ N0 and every τ ,
Eσ,τ
 1
Nn
Nn∑
p=1
R̂p
 ≤ γn(σ, τ) + 3ε,
where Nn = max {k ∈ N,Bk − 1 ≤ n} is the number of blocks that have been completed up to stage
n.
Proof. The proof is standard, hence details omitted. We first compare Eσ,τ [r̂p] to the average
payoff in block p. For notational ease, we relabel the stages of the pth block from 1 to L := Lp (and
condition on the history up to stage Bp). In the sequel, probabilities and expectations are with
respect to (σ, τ). By Lemma 10, P( |r̂− r˜λ(xλ,yL)| ≥ ε and θ > B) ≤ ε. Since r̂ = 0 if θ ≤ B, this
implies
E [r̂] ≤ E [r˜λ(xλ,yL)] ≤ E [r(xλ,yL)] .
Next, we show that E [r(xλ,yL)] differs from E
[
1
L
∑L
n=1 r(an,bn)
]
by at most ε2 . Indeed, the
contribution of stages n > θ to both summations is the same. By the choice of Z (see the proof of
Lemma 10), with probability at least 1 − ε, either (i) θ ≤ εL, or for every b ∈ B, (ii) b is played
less than εL/|B| times, or (iii) 1
L
∑
n<θ,bn=b
r(an, b) and
Nb
L
r(xλ, b) differ by at most ε/|B|. In each
case, r(xλ,yL) differs from
1
L
∑L
n=1 r(an,bn) by at most ε. Details are standard.
Therefore, for every n,
E
 1
Nn
Nn∑
p=1
R̂p
 ≤ E
 1
L1 + ...+ LNn
L1+...+LNn∑
p=1
r(sp,ap,bp)
+ 2ε
By the definition of the strategy of Mertens and Neyman it follows that (i) limk→∞ Lk/(L1+L2+
· · ·+ Lk−1) = 0, uniformly in τ , (ii) for each k, Lk is bounded. It follows that
E
[
1
L1+...+LNn
∑L1+...+LNn
p=1 r(sp,ap,bp)
]
differs from γn(σ, τ) by at most ε, provided n is large
enough.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 12
The proof is different when w(τ) ≤ δ, and when w(τ) > δ.
Lemma 14 If w(τ) > δ then (13) holds.
Proof. Since payoffs are between 0 and 1, and by (10),
Exλ,τ [λLr̂+ (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)] ≥ Exλ,τ [vλ(sL+1)]− λL
≥ vλ − ελL− λL,
and the result follows, since Exλ,τ [εI] ≥ εδ ≥ λL.
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It remains to deal with the case w(τ) ≤ δ. It is more convenient to reduce first the lemma to
the case of Markov strategies, and then to prove it for Markov strategies.
Given τ , define for every n ≤ L, yτn ∈ ∆(B) by
yτn = Exλ,τ [yn|θ > n] .
and denote by yτ the Markov strategy that plays yτn in stage n, irrespective of past play.
Plainly,
w(τ) = w(yτ ) and Exλ,τ [vλ(sL+1)] = Exλ,yτ [vλ(sL+1)] . (14)
Lemma 15 If w(τ) ≤ δ, then
Exλ,τ [r̂] ≥ Exλ,yτ [r̂]− 9ε.
Proof. Since w(τ) ≤ δ ≤ ε, by Lemma 10 we have
|Exλ,τ [r̂]−Exλ,τ [r˜λ(xλ,y)]| ≤ 3ε. (15)
and
|Exλ,yτ [r̂]−Exλ,yτ [r˜λ(xλ,y)]| ≤ 3ε. (16)
Denoting yτ = 1
L
∑L
n=1 y
τ
n, one has Pxλ,yτ
(
‖y − yτ‖ ≥ √δ and θ > L+ 1
)
≤ √δ ≤ ε, hence
|Exλ,yτ [r˜λ(xλ,y)]− r˜λ(xλ, yτ )| ≤ 2ε.
This implies that
|Exλ,yτ [r̂]− r˜λ(xλ, yτ )| ≤ 5ε. (17)
Since w(τ) ≤ δ,
‖yτn −Exλ,τ [yn]‖ = ‖Exλ,τ [yn |θ > L|]−Exλ,τ [yn]‖ ≤ 2δ.
By summation over n = 1, . . . , L we get
‖yτ −Exλ,τ [yL]‖ ≤ 2δ.
Therefore,
Exλ,τ [r˜(xλ,y)] ≥ r˜(xλ,Exλ,τ [y]) ≥ r˜λ(xλ, yτ )− ε,
where the first inequality follows by convexity of r˜, and the second one from the choice of δ. Using
(15) and (17) we get
Exλ,τ [r̂] ≥ Exλ,yτ [r̂]− 9ε.
Lemma 16 Let y be a Markov strategy such that w(y) ≤ δ. Then
Exλ,y [λLr̂+ (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)] ≥ vλ − εw(y)− 9ελL
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Proof. Call y the stationary strategy that plays y = 1
L
∑L
n=1 yn in every stage. Corollary 20
(proved in the appendix) implies that
|Exλ,y [vλ(sL+1)]−Exλ,y [vλ(sL+1)]| ≤ εw(y). (18)
Indeed we set Xi to be 1 if absorption occurs at stage i through some fixed action b under the
Markov strategy y and Yi to be 1 if absorption occurs at stage i through some fixed action b under
the average strategy y. Wi is 1 if absorption occurs at stage i through some action other than b
under the Markov strategy y and Zi to be 1 if absorption occurs at stage i through some action
other than b under the average strategy y. Similarly, Lemma 19 (in the appendix) implies that
|w(y)− w(y)| ≤ εw(y). (19)
Substituting τ = y in Lemma 15, Eq. (17) yields
|Exλ,y [r̂]− r˜λ(xλ, y)| ≤ 5ε. (20)
By (19), w(y) ≤ w(y)(1 + ε) ≤ δ(1 + ε) ≤ 2ε, hence∣∣∣∣∣r˜λ(xλ, y)−Exλ,y
[
1
L
L∑
n=1
r˜λ(sn, xλ, y)
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε. (21)
By the choice of L and λ, 1 > (1 − λ)L > 1 − ε. By (20), (21), and the ελ-optimality of xλ, one
obtains finally
Exλ,y [λLr̂+ (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)]
≥ Exλ,y [λLr˜λ(xλ, y) + (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)]− 5ελL
≥ Exλ,y
[
λ
L∑
n=1
r˜λ(sn, xλ, y) + (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)
]
− 7ελL− εw(y)
≥ Exλ,y
[
L∑
n=1
λ(1− λ)n−1r˜λ(sn, xλ, y) + (1− λ)L vλ(sL+1)
]
− 8ελL− w(y)
≥ vλ − 9ελL− εw(y).
Corollary 17 If w(τ) ≤ δ then (13) holds.
Proof. By Lemma 15, (14), Lemma 16 and (14) once again,
Exλ,τ [λLr̂+ (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)] ≥ Exλ,yτ [λLr̂+ (1− λL)vλ(sL+1)]− 9ελL
≥ vλ − εw(yτ )− 18ελL
≥ vλ − εw(τ)− 18ελL,
and the result follows.
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7 Absorbing games: the case of no signals
Coulomb (1992) proves that if the game is absorbing and player 1 knows only the current state,
then player 1 can guarantee the max-min value by stationary strategies. The purpose of this section
is to sketch a proof of this earlier result using the above tools. Details are standard and will be
omitted.
We let ε > 0 be given. We define r˜λ, vλ, xλ and v as in Section 6.1, d(a) to be the degree in
λ of λ 7→ xλ[a], and A = {a ∈ A, d(a) < 1}. Thus, A = {a ∈ A, limλ→0 λ/xλ(a) = 0}. We denote
by xλ ∈ ∆(A) the distribution on A induced by xλ. We shall prove that, depending on cases, xλ
or xλ guarantees v − 4ε, for λ sufficiently small. We choose λ0 > 0 small enough so that for every
λ < λ0 (i) the support of xλ is independent of λ, (ii) ‖xλ − xλ‖∞ ≤ ε, and (iii) |vλ − v| < ε.
For (x, y) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(B) we denote by w(x, y) the probability of absorption in a single stage
under (x, y), and, if w(x, y) > 0, by u(x, y) the expected absorbing payoff.
For every stationary strategy y ∈ ∆(B), denote αλ(y) = λλ+(1−λ)w(xλ,y) . Eq. (10) implies that
αλ(y)r˜λ(xλ, y) + (1− αλ(y))u(xλ, y) ≥ vλ − αλ(y)ε > v − 2ε (22)
(see Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) or Solan (1999) for this formula).
Since player 1 is informed only of transitions, and since A contains all actions that matter for
the indistinguishability relation, r˜λ(xλ, b) is constant for all b such that w(xλ, b) = 0.
On the other hand, if w(xλ, b) > 0 then limλ→0 αλ(b) = 0, hence by (22) u(xλ, b) ≥ v − 3ε for
every λ sufficiently close to 0.
Note that in both cases, |r(xλ, b)− r(xλ, b)| ≤ ε for λ close enough to 0.
Case 1: For some b0 ∈ B, w(xλ, b0) = 0 and r˜λ(xλ, b0) < v − 3ε.
We claim that, for λ close enough to zero, xλ guarantees vλ − 3ε. Indeed, let b ∈ B. If
w(xλ, b) = 0, then b0 ∼ b, and r˜λ(xλ, b) < v − 3ε. By (22), w(xλ, b) > 0 and u(xλ, b) ≥ v − 3ε.
On the other hand, we already know that u(xλ, b) ≥ v − 3ε if w(xλ, b) > 0. In particular, for
every b ∈ B, w(xλ, b) > 0 and u(xλ, b) ≥ v − 3ε. It follows that for every strategy τ of player 2
limn→∞ γn(xλ, τ) ≥ v − 3ε.
Case 2: For every b ∈ B, one has w(xλ, b) > 0 or r(xλ, b) ≥ r˜λ(xλ, b) ≥ v − 3ε.
We claim that, for λ close enough to zero, xλ guarantees vλ − 4ε. Indeed, let b ∈ B. If
w(xλ, b) = 0, then limn→∞ γn(xλ, b) = r(xλ, b) ≥ r(xλ, b) − ε ≥ v − 4ε. If w(xλ, b) > 0 then
for λ sufficiently small u(xλ, b) ≥ u(xλ, b) − ε ≥ v − 4ε. Thus, for every strategy τ of player 2
limn→∞ γn(xλ, τ) ≥ v − 4ε, provided λ is sufficiently small.
A Appendix
For any given integer L ∈ N, the function 1 −∏Li=1(1 − xi) is equivalent to 1 −∑Li=1 xi at zero.
The purpose of the next lemma is to verify that this equivalence holds uniformly over L.
Lemma 18 Consider the function fL : [0, 1]
L → R defined by fL(x) = 1−
∏L
i=1(1−xi). For every
L ∈ N and every x ∈ [0, 1]L such that fL(x) < 1/20 we have
0 ≤
L∑
i=1
xi − fL(x) ≤ 20(fL(x))2. (23)
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Proof. By induction, one has for every L ∈ N and every x1, ..., xL ∈ [0, 1]:
L∑
i=1
xi −
(
L∑
i=1
xi
)2
≤ fL(x) ≤
L∑
i=1
xi. (24)
Write s =
∑L
i=1 xi and f = fL(x). We claim that as long as s < 1/4,
0 ≤ s− f ≤
∞∑
n=1
cnf
2n , (25)
where cn = 2
1 × 23 × 27 × · · · × 22n−1 = 21+3+7+···+(2n−1) = 22×2n−(n+1) = 42n−n+12 .
Indeed, by (24) we have s − s2 ≤ f ≤ s, hence f ≤ s ≤ f + s2. In particular, 0 ≤ s − f . For
every n ∈ N the function x 7→ xn is convex, hence for every a, b ≥ 0, (a+ b)n ≤ 2n−1an + 2n−1bn.
Therefore
0 ≤ s− f ≤ s2 ≤ (f + s2)2 ≤ 21f2 + 21s4 ≤ 21f2 + 21(f + s2)4 ≤ 21f2 + 2123f4 + 2123s8.
Continuing inductively we get that for every N ∈ N,
s− f ≤
N∑
n=1
cnf
2n + cNs
2N+1 .
Note that for s < 1/4 the last term goes to 0 with N , and the radius of convergence of the power
series
∑∞
n=1 cnt
2n is 1/4.
For f < 1/20,
∑∞
n=1 cnf
2n ≤ 16f2 + 1/(1 − 4f2) ≤ 20f2, and then s ≤ f + 20f2 < 1/4. The
lemma follows.
Lemma 19 Let h(t) = 100t2. For every L ∈ N, and every sequence (Xi)i=1,...,L of independent
Bernouilli r.v.s with parameters pi ∈ [0, 1] the following holds. Set p = 1L
∑L
i=1 pi, and let (Yi)=1,...,L
be iid Bernouilli variables with parameter p. If P (
∑
iXi ≥ 1) ≤ 1/20 then∣∣∣∣∣P
(∑
i
Xi ≥ 1
)
−P
(∑
i
Yi ≥ 1
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ h
(
P
(∑
i
Xi ≥ 1
))
.
Proof. Set ω = P (
∑
iXi ≥ 1) = 1−
∏L
i=1(1−pi) ≤ 1/20, and ω′ = P (
∑
i Yi ≥ 1) = 1−(1−p)L.
By Lemma 18, ∣∣∣∣∣P
(∑
i
Xi ≥ 1
)
−E
[∑
i
Xi
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 20ω2, and∣∣∣∣∣P
(∑
i
Yi ≥ 1
)
−E
[∑
i
Yi
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 20ω′2.
By Lemma 18 and since 1− (1− p)L ≤ Lp, ω′ ≤ ω + 20ω2. Since E [∑iXi] = E [∑i Yi], the result
follows, with the right hand side h′(t) = 20(t2 + (t+ 20t2)2) < 100t2 = h(t) on (0,1/20).
Two real valued r.v.s X and Y are exclusive if XY = 0 a.s. Note that if X and Y are exclusive
Bernouilli r.v.s, then X + Y is a Bernouilli r.v. as well.
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Corollary 20 Let X1, ..., XL (resp. W1, ...,WL) Bernouilli r.v.s with parameter p1, ..., pL (resp.
q1, ...qL). Assume that for every n ≤ L, (a) Xn and Wn are exclusive, and (b) (Xn,Wn) is in-
dependent of (Xk,Wk)k<n. Let Y1, ..., YL (resp. Z1, ..., ZL) be iid Bernouilli r.v.s with parameter
p = 1
L
∑L
n=1 pn (resp. q =
1
L
∑L
n=1 qn). Assume that (Yn) and (Zn) satisfy (a) and (b) as well.
Define SX = min {n : Xn = 1}, and SY , SW , SZ similarly. If P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L) < 1/20 then
|P(SX ≤ min(SW , L))−P(SY ≤ min(SZ , L))| ≤ h1(P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L)),
where h1(t) = 201t
2.
Proof. Note that
P(SX ≤ L)−P(SX ≤ min(SW , L)) = P(SW < SX ≤ L). (26)
Note that since 1− pi− qi ≤ (1− pi)(1− qi), P(Xi =Wi = 0) ≤ P(Xi = 0)P(Wi = 0), for each
i = 1, . . . , L. Therefore, since (Xn,Wn) satisfy (a) and (b),
P(SW = k, L ≥ SX > k) = P(Wk = 1)P
(
L∑
i=k+1
Xi ≥ 1
)
k−1∏
i=1
P(Xi =Wi = 0)
≤ P(Wk = 1)P
(
L∑
i=k+1
Xi ≥ 1
)
k−1∏
i=1
P(Xi = 0)P(Wi = 0)
= P(SW = k)P(L ≥ SX > k)
≤ P(SW = k)P(SX ≤ L).
Summing up this inequality over k = 1, . . . , L yields
P(SW < SX ≤ L) ≤ P(SW ≤ L)P(SX ≤ L). (27)
Plainly, this result applies to Y and Z and one has also
P(SZ < SY ≤ L) ≤ P(SY ≤ L)P(SZ ≤ L). (28)
By (26), (27) and (28),
|P(SX ≤ min(SW , L))−P(SY ≤ min(SZ , L))| (29)
≤ |P(SX ≤ L)−P(SY ≤ L)|+P(SW ≤ L)P(SX ≤ L) +P(SY ≤ L)P(SZ ≤ L).
Set h(t) = 100t2. By Lemma 19 the first term in (29) is bounded by
|P(SX ≤ L)−P(SY ≤ L)| ≤ h(P(SX ≤ L)) ≤ h(P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L)).
The second term in (29) satisfies
P(SW ≤ L)P(SX ≤ L) ≤ P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L)×P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L).
Consider the third term in (29). Note that P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L) = P(X1+W1+...+XL+WL ≥ 1).
Applying Lemma 19 to the sequence (Xk+Yk)k, one has |P(min(SY , SZ) ≤ L)−P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L)| ≤
h(P(min(SX , SW ) ≤ L)). The proof is complete.
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